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RETHINKING BALANCING TESTS IN BLIGHT 
CONDEMNATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*F 
 A Response to Ilya Somin, Let There Be 
Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York after 
Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1193 
(2011). 
 
 Professor Somin has written an incisive 
critique of the New York Court of Appeals’ 
decisions in Kaur1 and Goldstein,2 the gist of 
which is that the Court did not do enough to stop 
“highly abusive blight condemnations.”3  There 
are, however, two difficulties with the critique.  
First, as a matter of legalistic interpretation of 
the New York Constitution, the critique is not 
very persuasive.  Second, as a matter of policy, 
Professor Somin’s proposal is unlikely to be 
adopted by any judge influenced by the same 
political process that lead to the condemnations 
that Professor Somin attacks. 
 Despite Professor Somin’s short argument to 
the contrary, there is nothing in the text or 
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    F Suggested citation: Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Mushy 
Balancing Tests in Blight Condemnation Jurisprudence, 39  
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 1. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 
(N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. 
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 2. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 
(N.Y. 2009). 
 3. Ilya Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in 
New York after Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1193, 
1194 (2011). 
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traditions of the New York Constitution requiring 
courts to play the role that Professor Somin 
suggests.  To the contrary, Article XVIII, section 
1, the provision on which Professor Somin relies 
to urge a more robust judicial policing of eminent 
domain, was created to facilitate precisely the 
sort of statist interventions on behalf of private 
parties that Professor Somin dislikes.  Article 
XVIII, section 1 permits condemnations that 
eliminate “substandard and insanitary 
conditions.”4  From its inception, however, this 
provision was used to eliminate under-populated 
but not especially blighted neighborhoods for the 
purpose of allowing private firms to improve these 
neighborhoods for private purposes. 
 Take Murray v. LaGuardia, a 1943 decision 
that Professor Somin cites for the proposition 
that the New York Constitution authorized only the 
condemnation of “slums.”5  Professor Somin’s 
interpretation greatly underestimates the 
capaciousness of the concept of “slum” to the 
progressive mind of the 1930s and 1940s: Virtually 
any working class neighborhood with dense 
structures that lacked basic amenities——central 
heating and private bathrooms, for instance——could 
be regarded as a slum in contemporary parlance.  
Murray, for instance, involved the condemnation of 
the so-called Gas House District on the Lower East 
Side of Manhattan during the 1940s, explicitly to 
facilitate Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s 
construction of the gigantic middle-income housing 
project known as “Stuyvesant Town.”6  However, the 
Gas House District, named for the Consolidated Gas 
Company’s facilities that occupied the area, was 
not especially noxious; surviving photos show 
streets lined with structurally sound shops and 
 
 4. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 5. Murray v. LaGuardia, 52 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1943). 
 6. See id. at 325. 
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apartments.7  As Samuel Zipp’s chapter on the Gas 
House District condemnation demonstrates, actual 
residents did not want their homes to be 
destroyed.8  By the standards of the 1940s, the 
buildings in the Gas House District were not 
horrible: “[H]ousing conditions were less than 
ideal,” with about half the buildings needing 
repairs and most without central heat or 
bathrooms.9  But, by the standards of the time, 
structures without private bathrooms or central 
heating were not unusual.  As late as 1960, 40% of 
houses in the United States lacked central 
heating.10  The case for the condemnation was not 
that the housing in the Gas House District was 
unequivocally worse than average New York City 
housing, but rather that the housing could be 
improved.  Therefore, the city arranged for the 
condemnation of an immense tract of land to 
benefit a specific private developer——Met Life——
simply to raise real estate values, provide 
middle-class urban housing, and improve welfare 
through reduced density.11 
 In short, the state constitution’s definition 
of eminent domain for slum clearance, as 
originally understood, allowed condemnations that 
transferred mediocre but not horrible 
neighborhoods from one set of private owners to a 
known private developer merely for the purpose of 
improving the quality of the housing.  This is 
exactly the sort of condemnation that Professor 
Somin opposes, and yet these condemnations are as 
deeply rooted in the history and law of New York 
as Stuyvesant Town. 
 
   7. See SAMUEL ZIPP, MANHATTAN PROJECTS: THE RISE AND FALL OF URBAN 
RENEWAL IN COLD WAR NEW YORK 90-95 (2010). 
 8. See id. at 76. 
 9. Id. at 85. 
 10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
http://factfinder. 
census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageId=tp14_housing_financi
al (last updated Sept. 17, 2004). 
 11. See ZIPP, supra note 4, at 77-115. 
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 If the strictly legal sources——the state 
constitution’s text and original understanding——do 
not support an aggressive role for New York courts 
in policing eminent domain, then what about policy 
considerations?  Here, I think that Professor 
Somin’s diagnosis stands on stronger ground.  But 
his prescription——tougher standards for finding 
neighborhoods to be “blighted”——seems less 
convincing because the cure is unlikely to be 
adopted by the patient and because there are other 
medicines that might be more effective and more 
palatable. 
 The best policy argument that courts should 
play a more vigorous role in policing eminent 
domain is that the costs of false positives 
(eminent domain that reduces social welfare) 
exceed the costs of false negatives (lack of land 
assembly that reduces social welfare) resulting 
from either private land markets or more robust 
judicial review.  The history of eminent domain 
abuse during the era of urban renewal suggests a 
number of potential false positives——that is, 
governmental tendencies to over-use eminent 
domain.  One can hypothesize a political economy 
to explain such over-use where majorities of 
voters ignore the social costs of eminent domain 
because they affect only a small group of 
landowners, while influential elites press for 
more land assembly because they will reap the 
surpluses from assembly as a result of their 
political connections.  In theory, the 
compensation paid to condemnees ought to induce 
local taxpayers to use eminent domain only when 
the benefits exceed the tax burden.12  In practice, 
much of eminent domain’s cost is spread across the 
entire nation of taxpayers through federal grants, 
diffusing the incentive of voters to monitor the 
 
 12. For the classic defense of this position, see generally 
Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
61 (1986). 
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costs very carefully.13  Moreover, the measures of 
compensation typically exclude lost business 
goodwill and consumers’ subjective value of their 
housing, leaving condemnees manifestly under-
compensated.14  One can plausibly assume, 
therefore, that certain jurisdictions will engage 
in too much land assembly at significant social 
cost. 
 The problem is that the alternatives to 
judicial deference are not ideal.  False 
negatives, induced by aggressive judicial policing 
of local governments’ decisions have costs to the 
extent that private land markets do not assemble 
urban land at an efficiently high rate.  The 
reason for excessively low private assembly is the 
familiar holdout problem: If each landowner on a 
city block knows that her parcel is necessary for 
a private land assembly to go forward, then she 
has an incentive to misrepresent the opportunity 
costs of foregoing the pre-assembly use of the 
land in order to extract whatever surplus is 
created by the assembly.  That landowners refuse 
to sell even when it is in their interest to do so 
is demonstrated by the familiar anecdotes about 
disappointed prospective sellers opportunistically 
increasing their asking price one time too many, 
thereby inducing prospective buyers to simply 
build the proposed structure around the 
recalcitrant holdout’s parcel.15  That similar 
tactics might doom cost-justified assemblies is 
not difficult to imagine. 
 So which is more costly——excessive eminent 
domain inadequately deterred by democratic 
politics, or insufficient land assembly 
inadequately advanced by the strategic bargaining 
 
 13. On the role of federal grants in diminishing the 
incentive of local voters to control eminent domain, see 
William Fischel, Before Kelo: Federal Grants Encourage 
Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 28 REG. MAG. 32 (2005). 
 14. See id. at 35. 
 15. For a litany of such anecdotes lovingly described, see 
ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, NEW YORK’S ARCHITECTURAL HOLDOUTS (1984). 
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of buyers and sellers?  This is obviously a tricky 
empirical question.  I am inclined to side with 
Professor Somin in thinking that the costs of the 
false positives exceed the costs of the false 
negatives.  But I suspect that the average state 
supreme court judge will not take up Professor 
Somin’s invitation to weigh these imponderable 
magnitudes.  According to Professor Somin, judges 
should assess whether there is too much private 
influence causing, or too little public benefit 
resulting from, the use of eminent domain.  It is 
difficult to imagine, however, that very many 
judges will accept an invitation to deploy such 
mushy and policy-laden tests in the interest of 
those libertarian values that Professor Somin and 
I share.  After all, the same political influences 
that allegedly lead to excessive use of eminent 
domain will also affect the appointment of state 
judges.  Why would the political economy that 
Professor Somin decries somehow stop at the 
courtroom door?  Judges appointed by business 
coalitions are likely to trust businessmen who 
secure the right to develop condemned tracts.  
Judges appointed by planning-oriented politicians 
with a penchant for statist reorganization of real 
estate patterns are likely to share a trust in 
state planning.  The mushy balancing tests urged 
by Professor Somin seem well-suited to allowing 
judges to do whatever they like.  And what they 
like to do, for the most part, is defer to 
politicians. 
 Indeed, some of the tests urged by Professor 
Somin are actually self-contradictory.  Consider, 
first, the idea that judges should be especially 
suspicious of condemnations where the identity of 
the private developer is known in advance.16  On 
 
 16. Justice Kennedy stressed this point in his Kelo 
concurrence where he found that the New London Development 
Authority’s condemnation of Kelo’s house was not primarily 
motivated by a desire to benefit private parties given that 
“[t]he identities of most of the private beneficiaries were 
unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.” Kelo v. 
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this theory, judges should encourage cities to 
raze whole city blocks before cities have a firm 
commitment from a specific developer, to insure 
that the decision to use eminent domain was not 
tainted by private influence.  But such a “purity 
first” approach to land assembly would be madness 
from the perspective of sensible planning, another 
factor urged by Professor Somin.  Absent a 
specific and reliable developer’s commitment, the 
assembled land might sit undeveloped for years 
before the city can find someone to bear the costs 
of improving it.  That Bruce Ratner was involved 
from the outset in the development of Atlantic 
Yards17 might suggest corruption, but it might also 
suggest that the relevant politicians were not 
such fools as to think that they could embark on a 
major land assembly without firm commitment from a 
developer with a track record of success in 
managing commercial development in Brooklyn.  
(Ratner demonstrated such success by his 
developing Metrotech Center, a few blocks west of 
Atlantic Yards).  By contrast, the New London site 
now sits barren and empty as a result of the New 
London Development Authority’s failure to secure a 
specific development commitment from a reliable 
developer up front.18 
 In short, I doubt that many state judges will 
employ any of the four factors urged by Professor 
Somin to place major constraints on eminent 
domain.  The factors are simply too mushy and 
policy-laden.  Even a judge making a good-faith 
effort to deploy these factors might balk at 
distinguishing between a municipality’s careful 
 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 17. See Atlantic Yards, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/subjects/a/atlantic_yards_brooklyn/index.html 
(last updated Mar. 17, 2011). 
 18. Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html. 
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selection of a reliable developer in advance of a 
project (the hallmark of good planning) and the 
municipality’s being unduly influenced by that 
same developer (the hallmark of corruption). 
 What other reforms might be both more 
effective and more palatable to the policymakers 
(judges, state legislators, city leaders, etc.) 
that must, after all, install the reforms?  Here 
is a modest suggestion: Give condemnees their 
attorney’s and expert witness fees whenever the 
compensation award after trial is higher than the 
initial good-faith offer made by the condemnor in 
advance of condemnation.  Such a reform has the 
advantage of employing the self-interest of that 
most assiduous breed of lobbyists——trial lawyers——
toward the cause of constraining eminent domain.  
Moreover, the award of fees will create an 
incentive for the initial offers to be 
sufficiently high that, in an age of federal grant 
austerity, the likelihood of excessive use of 
eminent domain will be reduced, if not eliminated.  
Finally, the fee approach uses a crisp, bright 
line rule without mushy definitions of “blight,” 
“private influence,” or “public benefit.”  
 Is it the perfect antidote to the overuse of 
eminent domain?  No——there is no perfect antidote.  
One could, of course, eliminate all eminent 
domain.  But, that would exclude the indisputably 
necessary condemnations that could be preserved by 
painstakingly defining when an area is 
uncontroversially noxious enough to justify 
eminent domain.  Yet, this sort of detailed code 
might likely lead to false negatives——that is, 
failure to use eminent domain even when the status 
quo is merely shabby rather than noxious and the 
proposed assembly is a reasonably good idea.  
After all, Stuyvesant Town seems like an 
improvement on the Gas House District.  Do we 
really want a test that would make such a change 
impossible? 
 
